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PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION
E VERY consideration of valuation of a public utility, whether
for the purpose of condemnation for purchase or as a basis
for fixing rates or permitting the issue of stock or bonds, must
.start from Sinyth v. Ames,' and the rule therein laid down by
HARLAN, J., at page 546: "We hold, however, that the basis of all
•calculations as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a
corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must
be the fair value of the property being used by it for the con-
venience of the public,. And in order to ascertain that value the
original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent
improvements, the amount and market value of its bonds and stock,
the present as compared with the original cost of construction, the
probable earning capacity of the property under particular rates
prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating ex-
penses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such
weight as may be just and right in each case. We do not say there
may not be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of
the property. What the company is entitled to ask is a fair return
up6n the value of that which it employs for the public convenience.
On the other hand, what the public is entitled to demand is that no
more be exacted from it for the use of a public highway than the
services are reasonably worth." In all the cases since that has proved
a sufficiently comprehensive statement, and by the provision for
"other matters to be regarded" it has proven sufficiently elastic for
free development in the light of experience. The question here to
be proposed is whether, in the light of the rich experience of the
twenty years since Smyth v. Ames, it is not possible and desirable
to adopt a narrow and definite rule, one not based on so many
matters, with so much room for individual opinion, but on one
matter that is capable of reasonable, definite ascertainment.
The United States Supreme Court was much troubled by the great
question involved in Munn v. Illinois,2 and some of the judges were,
and long continued to be, filled with forebodings as to the plagues
that might be let loose by the pronouncement of the majority of the
court in that case, but it is safe to say not one of them foresaw what
a field of inquiry the judges, trained in the law, but not in finance
and engineering, must later enter because the court had decided that
when property was devoted to a use in which the public had an inter-
I (z899) z69 U. S. 466.
2(1876) 94 U. S. 113.
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est, it granted to the nublic an interest in that use and must submit
to public control of the property for the common good, to the extent
of such interest. That was forty years ago, but it was not until
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota,3 thirte- a
years later, that it was settled that this control was subject to super-
vision by the courts to see that the legislature did not by that control
in effect confiscate property, either by taking it, or by so reducing
the rate of returns arising from its use as to make it of no value.
Not only were the judges inexpert in the extremely complicated
problems connected with the value and earnings of the great public
utility plants, but the courts and court procedure were ill adapted
to deal with the questions involved. However, as has often been
pointed out,4 the difficulty of the matter was no reason why the
courts should shirk their duties, and under our system of govern-
ment there seems to 'be no other safe final arbiter between the rights
of the public and the rights of private property under our constitu-
tional guarantees except our courts. They have of course been
greatly aided in their work by the commissions, composed of men
who acquire expert knowledge in this field, and whose findings in
the great majority of cases are accepted, and in any case the legis-
lature, the body with which Munn v. Illinois seemed to leave this
control, was far more incapable of just and final judgment than are
the courts.
And so it comes to pass that now, after about twenty-five years
of experimentation, we have a pretty well defined field of public
service problems, and an elaborate and measurably well adapted
organization of commissions, with expert lawyers, engineers and
economists, working under a body of fairly well understood prin-
ciples.
The scope, limitations, and meaning of the various valuation
theories suggested in the rule of Smyth v. Ames have all been many
times sufficiently discussed, and are now so far agreed upon that
they may be here assumed without elaboration. The cases following
Smyth v. Ames have been so often gathered, especially by WHiTnlN
in his valuable volumes on "V.ALUATION OV PUBLIC StRVlCZ CORPOR-
ATIONS," that no effort will here be made to cite or notice cases except
as they may be needed to develop the discussion, or may have been
before the courts or commissions during the past two years. Special
mention will be made of some of these most recent discussions. It
has often been pointed out that it was very fortunate that the courts
*(r89o) 134 U. S. 418.
* See for example Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Tompkins, (9oo) 176 U. S. x67, x72,
179, per Brewer, J.
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did not at the outset formulate a hard and fast rule. Is it not pos-
sible it may be equally unfortunate if we never arrive at a more
definite rule than was desirable in the pioneer case of Smyth v.
Ames? A study of the cases, with their varying standards and con-
fused conclusions, makes clear the desirability of a sure basis that
will not make price for condemnation or fixing a schedule of rates
so much a matter of individual judgment of the commission or court
before which the hearing is had, and so little determined by definite
and certain facts and figures interpreted by fixed and equitable rules.
This is reflected in many of the recent decisions of the courts, notab-
ly in the elaborately considered Minnesota Rate Cases
5 and especially
in the discussions of valuations by the various state commissions"
and the Interstate Commerce Commission. As long ago as 1903, in
In re Proposed Advances in Freight RatesJ the matter was thus
stated by Commissioner PRouTy: "It is plain that until there be
fixed, either by legislative enactment or judicial interpretation, some
definite basis for the valuation of railroad property and some limit
up to which that property shall be allowed to earn upon that valua-
tion, there can be no exact determination of these questions. In the
absence of such a standard the tribunal, whether court or commis-
sion, which is called upon to consider this matter, can only rely upon
the exercise of its best judgment." How unsatisfactory the com-
mission has found this state of the rule is shown in many cases,
such, e. g., as In re Advances in Rates, Western Case, The Burling-
ton's Claim.8 Congress, in its recent order to the commission to
value the railroads of the country, has not dissipated, though it has
limited, this uncertainty by requiring the commission to ascertain and
report in detail three cost values, i. e., original cost to date, the cost
of reproduction new, the cost of reproduction less depreciation. In
addition other values and elements of value affecting the ultimate
facts of value are to be considered, so that this leaves us very much
where we were with Smyth v. Ames. What final basis of valuation
will be adopted does not certainly appear.9
Whatever weight in particular cases may have been attached to
the various elements of the rule in Smyth v. Antes, a historical sur-
vey shows that from them two valuation theories, and only two have
5 (1913) 230 U. S. 352.
5 Re Grafton County Electric Light & Power Co. (N. H.) P. U. R. ixz6E, 879,
853; Public Service Commission v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Wash.) P. U. R. 1916D 947.
'(i9o3) 9 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 404.
8 (191) 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307, 337.
9 As to other statutes see In re Blue Hill Street Ry. Co., (Mass.) P. U. R. gisE,
379; Public Service Commission v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., (Wash.) P. U. R. i6D, 947,
in which the commission did not think the statute controlling in fixing value. Other
cases will be noted later.
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emerged with any following, viz.: the actual cost and the cost of
reproduction, and it is only with some form of these valuation
theories that we need concern ourselves in these pages. Market
values as shown by actual sale,10 stock and bond issue," or even earr
ing capacity, 2 under exceptional circumstances may have been con-
sidered of controlling weight, but no court or commission has ever
suggested these as the main guide in the normal case. Refer-
ence to a few cases will give the mere sketch that shows the trend.
In the Railroad Commission Cases" the dissenting opinions of
Justices HARLAN and FIELD show that already the question of
value was coming forward as the basis of determining rate
regulation. The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice
WAITE,. whose opinion in Munn v. Illinois led to such vast
consequences. It is not strange that he did not find it neces-
sary to consider value in rate cases. But HARLAN, J.,
in dissenting, said: "Would they [private capitalists] have
risked the immense sums invested in these enterprises had the
charters of the companies contained a provision making rates to
depend, not on the capabilities, wants, and interests of the territory
to be supplied with railroad service, or on the amount expended in
constructing and maintaining these roads, but on their 'valzie' as
estimated by commissioners, and on such basis as the latter, from
time to time, might deem to be justified by 'experience and business
operations?' Their value upon what basis, or at what period of
their existence? When they were constructed? Or what they
would bring at a sale under a decree of court?" Here we have a
challenge from the very justice who afterward wrote the notable
opinion in Smyth v. Ames,' 4 the great landmark in all valuation
cases. And the value that appealed to him was not the present
value, but the original cost, the amount adventured in the enter-
prise. In the same case FIELD, J., also dissented, saying," "'Certainly
no one will deny that the right to adopt a rate of charges, subject,
as such rate always is, to the condition that they shall be reasonable,
was of vital importance to the company. Without that concession
no one acquainted with the difficulties, expenses, and hazards of the
projected enterprise can believe that it would have been undertaken.
"0 Commercial Club v. Public Utilities Commission (Mo.) P. U. R. 19r5C, 1017, 1031;
Dow v. Beidelman, (1887) x25 U. S. 68o, cited in San Diego Land & Town Co. v.
Jasper, (1902) 189 U. S. 439, 443.
3 San Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City, 0899) i74 U. S. 739.
1San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, (I897) 118 Calif. 556.
2(r886) 1x6 U. S. 307.
"4 (x898) z69 U. S. 468.
5At page 343.
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It was certainly the expectation of the constructors of the road that
they should be allowed to receive compensation having some rela-
tion to its cost. But the act of Mississippi allows only such com-
pensation as parties appointed by the legislature, not interested in
the property nor required to possess any knowledge of the intricacies
and difficulties of the business, shall determine to be a fair return
on the value of the road and its appurtenances, though that may be
much less than the briginal cost. Within the last few years, such
have been the improvements in machinery, and such the decline in
the cost of materials, that it is probably less expensive by one-third
to build and equip the road now than it was when the contractors
completed it. Does anybody believe that they would have under-
taken the work or proceeded with it, had they been informed that,
notwithstanding their vast outlays, they should only be allowed,
when it was finished, to receive a fair return upon its value, however
much less than cost that might be?" Here are the main points that
were to be met with in the next thirty years. These judges dissented,
and their view has remained in the minority. But now a change in
the trend of prices puts a new economic front on the whole situation.
One of the earliest valuation cases was Reagan v. Farmers Loan
& Trust Co.,"6 in which it was held that when it appeared that the
road cost far more than the stock and bonds outstanding, that such
stock and bonds represented money invested in the construction,
that there had been no waste or mismanagement, that rates had
been continually lowered, and that the earnings for three years
had been insufficient to pay the interest on the bonded debt, a tariff
still further reduing the earnings was confiscatory. The prevailing
idea seemed to be that, if possible without prejudice to the rights
of the public, those who had invested in railroad enterprises should
have some profit for the use of their money. Clearly here, though
no specific theory was adopted, and no exact valuation was fixed,
the court was thinking of return on the investment actually made,
and not at all on reproduction value; and so in Brymer v. Butler
Water Co.,' 7 the court thought the "cost of the water to the com-
pany includes a fair return to the persons who furnished the capital
for the construction of the plant." To allow the public to take
advantage of the fact that similar works at the present time could
be constructed for far less than this did cost would be unjust.'
8
Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co. 9 may be taken as the best
case of its type. In this case the investment theory, and capitaliza-
16 (1893) 154 U. S. 362.
IT(0897) 179 Pa. St. 23I.
"8San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego, (1897) ix Calif. 556.
19 (1897) 69 Minn. 353.
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tion upon earnings as well, were urged upon the attention of the
court. It emphatically rejected both, and also the amount of. the
stock and bonds. "The material question is not what the railroad
cost originally, but what it would cost to reproduce it." The right-
of bondholders are no more and no less sacred than the rights of
other property owners. If the road was built when iron rails cost
$85 per ton and everything else in proportion, and now steel rails
cost $16 per ton, if it cost $4ooo a mile to build the older portions
of the road when last year as good a road was built for $12,ooo, that
is the misfortune o'f the owners who paid the higher prices. The
state does not guarantee the invester in a railway more than in other
property. The "cost of reproduction" must be estimated on a pres-
ent cash basis.
It is very significant that the Steenerson case, and a number of
others like it, arose in the hard times of the early nineties, when
reproduction cost was very low and the public would be very averse
to allowing earnings on the original cost, which was much higher.
And here an enlightened unselfishness on the part of the public might
have had its reward. It could not then, of course, be discerned that
at the time that decision was being read prices were already mount-
ing on a curve that has been rising almost continuously 'for twenty
years, and that the question would soon be reversed so that the public
would ask the railroads whether they were to be allowed to ask a
return on the present high cost of everything entering into the con-
struction of a road when the amount actually invested was but a
fraction of present cost of reproduction. The same argument that
had such weight in the Steenerson case was urged upon the court in
a case decided the next year.2" It was rejected as unjust and con-
trary to facts. "In countries conditioned as Texas has been and is,
such a railroad property and business cannot be reproduced, except
substantially in the same manner in which this has been produced.
It is not only impracticable, but impossible to reproduce this road,
in any just sense, or according to any fair definition of those terms.
A system of rates based on such a narrow basis as that is confisca-
tory." The court here refers to the road as "a going business con-
cern," using the term not as it is now so commonly used as a com-
plement to reproduction-less-depreciation value, but as showing
the utter injustice of the reproduction at present prices theory.
Though this case was decided some months after Smyth v. Ames it
does not refer to it, or seem to be influenced by it, which seems very
extraordinary and altogether exceptional. Evidently the dominat-
2
' Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Houston & T. C. R. Co. (Dec. 1898) go Fed. 683.
210
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ing influence of the rule in Smyth v. Ames was not yet appreciated,
for another case 21 in the same year, though it refers to Smyth v.
Anes, decided in Mairch, 1898, cites it only on the question of the
rule as to reasonable rates, not on the great question of valuation.
This case, too, rejected the cost of reproduction for the "amount
really and necessarily invested in the enterprise." It insisted that
the only way the consolidated road could have been built up was by
buying out the old horse car lines and making junk of most of the
old rails and equipment. To the $5,ooo,ooo cost of reproduction the
court adds a lump sum of $2,ooo,ooo as the least addition, though
the total cost seems to have been $9,ooo,ooo. This is one of those
guesses so often found in valuation cases, which has at least a
chance of being within a few millions of correct, and which is a
kind of average of various valuations. It answers here well enough
because adding even this amount shows the proposed rates too low,
and so it is not necessary to make more exact valuation.
The cost-of-reproduction theory was first urged by attorneys
representing the public. The upward tendency in cost of construc-
tion and equipment soon made the public-utility attorneys urge
the same thing, so that it is not strange to find the courts and com-
missions lending an ever readier ear to this basis of valuation and
giving it an ever larger influence in determining value. There was
not of course a change in the decisions in perfectly regular succes-
sion in point of time, but after Smyth v. Ames the tendency is
marked to give cost-of-reproduction a growing importance. In San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. National City,2 2 Justice'HA iLAN. upheld
the opinion of the circuit court in the same case23 that it is the actual
value of the property at the time the rates are to be fixed, and not
its cost, that should form the basis on which to compute rates.
"What the company is entitled to demand, in order that it may have
just compensation, is a fair return upon the reasonable value of the
property at the time it is being used for the public." It may have
cost more than it ought to have cost and the bonds may be in excess
of its real value. justice HARLAN does not say what the allowance
should be if it did not cost more than it ought to have cost, nor that
reproduction value at present prices was the controlling considera-
tion. Indeed the United States Supreme Court-fortunately as it
seems to the writer-has never done that, 'but that was evidently the
leading idea. This qase was before the utilities were welcoming
reproduction-cost, and the company was attacking it, but the Federal
= Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Milwaukee, (May x8W) S7 Fed. 577.
' (1899) X74 U. S. 739.
3 (1896) 74 Fed- 79.
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courts, like the Minnesota court in the Steenerson case, refused to
listen to the objections. Justice HoLmIs in San Diego Land &
Town Co. v. Jasper 24 approved of the rule quoted above from the
National City case as no longer open to dispute. Cost may be cor
sidered, but in the present case "it has very little importance indeed."
And Justice PLCKHAM in Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.25 agreed
with the court below (and with several intermediate cases in the
Supreme Court) in holding that "the value of the property is to be
determined as of the time when the inquiry is made regarding the
rates. If the property, which legally enters into the consideration
of the question of rates, has increased in value since it was acquired,
the company is entitled to the benefit of such increase." He seems
to sense the danger, not so far ahead, that the enormous increase in
property valuation in the great cities might make the reproduction
theory untenable as a prime test of valuation, and provides for a
possible exception if the property should increase "so enormously in
value as to render a rate permitting a reasonable return upon such
increased value unjust to the public." He declines to pass upon what
might be done in such a case. Is it too much to say that such cases
have become so common as to make it necessary, if justice is to be
done, to turn from the cost-of-reproduction theory as having any
determining value in condemnation or rate problems today? In the
Consolidated Gas case would the courts think it unjust to the public
to increase the cost of gas to the public so as to allow for this incre-
ment of value, due not at all to anything furnished by the owners of
the utility, but solely to the appreciation of property and materials?
Cost of reproduction originally commended itself because "original
cost" was considered untrustworthy. "Original cost may have been
too great; mistakes of construction, even though honest, may have
been made, which necessarily enchanced the cost; more property
may have been acquired than necessary or needful for the purpose
intended."26  Some years of experience with valuation cases were
needed to show how equally unreliable are cost-of-reproduction esti-
mates, and how the uncertainties of original cost can be checked and
corrected.
Without following in detail the course of the reproduction doc-
trine through the cases it will serve the present purpose to notice
that impossible situations soon arose as prices appreciated after
19oo, of which a good illustration may be found in In re Advances
1(1903) 189 U. S. 439,
1 (19g9) 212 U. S. 19.
28 Stanislaus Co. v. San Joaquin C. & I. Co., (1904) 192 U. S. 20, 214, per Peck-




in Rates-Western Case, The Burlington's Claim of Legal Right.
21
The contention was that the road was entitled "as a matter of legal
right to a fair return upon the actual value of its property used for
transportation, which value from whatever source in the past
created, is measured in its case by at least the cost of presently re-
producing its physical plant." It represented that the Burlington
road cost those who built it $258,000,000, that it would cost to repro-
duce it $530,000,000, to which should be added some amount for
going-concern-value, and a further amount for franchise rights. This
belongs to the owners and they are entitled to a fair return upon it,
though much more than $270,000,000 of it does not represent the
investment of a dollar by the owners, and the road is now earning
nearly i8% dividends on the stock, beside paying all interest on the
bonds. Yet it seeks permission to raise its rates on the ground that
it is an insufficient return on the actual fair value of the road as it
exists today as a going concern, which is the sole inquiry open at
this time. These contentions the Commission refused to approve.
Of course the Supreme Court has never gone so far as to approve
reproduction cost as the sole test of value, and later when such a
contention reached it in the Minnesota Rate Cases,
28 it was definitely
rejected, as will be more fully pointed out hereafter. In the Burling-
ton case, and still more in the Minnesota Rate Cases, the increased
values were largely due to the enormous rise in property values in
the great cities where these roads owned large terminals. But es-
pecially in the case of the Northern Pacific was involved a very large
increase, along the whole right of way, of the values of land which
had originally been given to the railroad by the government. If a
valuation were to be made today it would include also a great in-
crease in value of material and equipment, much of it due to an
abnormal rise in prices during the past year. The present purpose
is merely to point out the tendency and possible ultimate result of
any adherence to the cost-of-reproduction theory as the basis, or
most important guide, in the valuation of public utilities. It is not
strange, therefore, to find some very late cases showing a tendency
to abandon this view in favor of' something like the earlier conten-
tions of the companies as shown in the Houston & T. C. case, supra.
It has been very well expressed by the New York Public Service
Commission :20 "The fair amount of the investment upon which the
return should be computed, may be better ascertained by giving
^ (1gi1) 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307, 337, per Commissioner Lane.
2(1913) 230 U. S. 352. 455.
"(1915) Fuhrman v. Cataract Power Co., 3 Pub. Serv. Com. Rep. (2nd Dist.) 656.
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greater weight to the actual cost as the basis of inquiry than in any
other way."' 0
Having followed in a general way the struggles of the contending
ideas, we may now consider briefly the advantages and disad
vantages of the two theories as they are brought out by the cases.
It may be admitted at once that very great difficulties inhere in
valuation problems, and there is no prospect that any rule can be
devised that will entirely eliminate them. Some objections to the
actual cost theory have already been noticed.3' The chief additional
objections are that actual cost covers much that has become worn
out and obsolete, that owing to complicated organization and re-
organization, consolidations and holding companies, it is impossible
to ascertain in many cases the cost of the utility serving a particular
community, and most fatal of all that books have been destroyed, or
if preserved so kept that it is impossible to determine with any
accuracy what the actual cost has been. Moreover, in many cases
there have been foreclosure sales which have entirely eliminated all
original investors and all holding under them, and it is urged that
where such sales have been made the purchaser is entitled to the
advantage of his bargain if he paid less than actual value, just as he
would have to bear his loss if he had paid too much.
3 2
We must take a closer look at the workings of the cost-of-repro-
duction theory, or the cost-of-reproduction-less-depreciation theory,
a theory which has been supposed to show more than any other the
"value of the property at the time it is being used for the public."
The problem has been comprehensively stated thus: "The basis of
all calculations as to the reasonableness of rates is the fair value of
the property used for the convenience of the public,-not its cost,
nor the amount of money expended upon it, but its value as a pro-
ducing factor, taking into consideration its location, character of the
country through which it passes, and the reasonable expectation of
business coming to it. * * * It may have-indeed, probably has-
cost more than this [the value found by the master]. But, in
estimating the value of the property, we must take, not what was its
value in the past, nor what it cost, nor what it would cost to dupli-
cate it, nor its probable future value, but the estimate must be based
on its present value,"33 i. e., we may assume from most cases, a value
30 Quoted with approval in Herman v. Newton Gas Co. (N. Y.) P. U. R. xgs6D,
8a5, 840. Further cases will be noticed later.
31 see especially Stanislaus Co. v. San Joaquin C. & I. Co., (1904) 592 U. S. 2o,
214, which has been considered as the final rejection of the actual cost theory.
-Steenerson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., (897) 69 Minn. 353,; Cumberland Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Louisville, (1911) 187 Fed. 7.
13 Matthews v. Board of Corp. Com'rs of North Carolina, (igso) xo6 Fed. 637.
PUBLIC UTILITY VALUATION
fixed by considering all the matters suggested in Smyth v. Ames, but
chiefly the cost of reproduction, less depreciation, plus certain added
elements discovered in different cases that make up its value as a
producing factor, as a live, going business"
4  Actual cost, stock and
bond issue, probable earning capacity, have nothing to do with this
problem except as they may furnish evidence more or less, and
usually less, valuable as to the present value of the plant being used
in the public service. Earning capacity might seem to have much to
do with value as used in reference to an ordinary business, but not
as to a public utility whose earnings are subject to be fixed by public
regulation. Of course earning capacity cannot fix value when it is
settled that value is the basis for fixing earnings.
35
There can be little doubt that the cost-of-reproduction theory, as
now applied, -is by most courts and commissions given large, if
not controlling, influence in valuations, either for purposes of con-
demnation or fixing rates." Engineers very naturally prefer it.
Any other theory would largely eliminate the engineer to make place
for the accountant, certainly after once a base valuation has been
fixed. Present methods make abundant employment for both, and
for lawyers as well. They are good for these professions, if not for
the companies and the public. Commissions follow cost-of-repro-
duction largely, but not exclusively, and have worked out elaborate
rules and formulae to be used in ascertaining the various elements
entering into such a valuation.37
And yet the Interstate Commerce Commission has balked at the
results of following it to its logical end,
38 and is now under mandate
from Congress to value the railroads of the country by each theory.
State statutes often require consideration of the various kinds of
valuations."" The Supreme Court of the United States has persisted
in its declaration, first laid down in Smyth v. Ames, as to consider-
" Knoxville v. Knoxville 'Water Co., (I909) 212 U. S. x.
35 Spring Valley Water Works v. San Francisco, (1911) 192 Fed. 137; Re Proposed
Advances in Freight Rates (1903) 9 I. C. C. Rep. 382, 403.
36 See Pioneer Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Westenhaver (1x9x) 29 Okla. 429, 434; Re Chesa-
peake & P. Tel. Co. (Md.) P. U. R. ig,6C, 925, 944; Legal Basis of Rate Regulation,
ir Col. L. Rev. 532, 545, and cases cited.
37In re janesville Water Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. xg5A 178; Springfield v. Springfield
Gas & El. Co. (Ill.) P. U. R. x916C, 281, 362, criticising the Wisconsin method of com-
putation.
n35Re Advanced Rates-Western Case (191a) 20 i. C. C. Rep. 337.
39See Re Grafton County L. & P. Co. (N. H.) P. U. R. x9 i6E, 879 at 883, as to the
New Hampshire statute; Re Dunham (A o.) P. U. R. z916E 544, at s96 and Re St.
Louis & S. F. R. Co. (Mo.) P. U. R. i9t6F 49. as to the Missouri statutes; Public
Service Comm. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Wash.) P. U. R. 19x6D 947, holding that
the Washington statute does not prevent the Commission from adopting some other
basis than those named in the statute in fixing the value.
40 (1898) 169 U. S. 466.
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ing all theories, and in the recent important Minnesota Rate-
Cases"' definitely declines to consider reproduction value at what-
ever point its results would lead to values the court considers not
fair. Truly this is an uncertain and indefinite situation that calls fo"
some more stable basis, if any there be. It is not strange to find
such a protest against the cost-of-reproduction method as was made
only July last by the New Hampshire Commission12 in which it
definitely refused to consider as valuable assumptions based on
things that never happened, and estimates requiring the projection
of the engineering imagination into the future, and methods of con-
struction and installation that have never been and never will be
adopted by sane men. Moreover, when the opposing sides employ
each its own experts the valuations differ widely in results, and the
commission's own experts are so far from any of those, and the trial
courts often from all of them, and the court of last resort not in-
frequently from the determinations of the lower court, not merely
on unimportant items, but on the fundamental things that decide the
case, that conditions result fit for a kingdom of Chaos but not
for a regulated society. Is this due to difficulties inherent in the
subject, or to a failure thus far to adopt theories and methods sound
in principle and certain and practical in operation?
An examination of values found by the reproduction theory shows
at once what a wide and wild field for guessing it affords. A few
illustrations will suffice. Many could be given. In Cedar Rapids Gas
Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids,42 the plant had cost $267,00o, had been
assessed for valuation on the sworn statements of its president at
$io8,ooo, which was raised by the taxing board to $25o,ooo, and
was now claimed by the company on its engineers' reproduction
valuation to be worth $368,ooo. On this showing the court guesses
a fair valuation as $300,ooo to $350,000. So far as appears a guess
at $250,000 would have been equally binding and justified. In
Wilicox v. Consolidated Gas Co.4" real estate was valued at $11,985,-
435, plants at $15,500,000. Justice PECKHAM points out that both
these valuations depended largely upon the opinions of expert wit-
nesses as to the value of that kind of property, which differed quite-
radically from the estimates of defendant, and therefore were more
or less in doubt. "It, in other words, becomes a matter of specula-
tion 'or conjecture to a great extent." In a recent California case 45
41 (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 455.
4'Re Grafton County L. & P. Co. (N. H.) P. U. R. z916E 879 at 882.
4 (i9o9) 144 Iowa 426.
4 (1909) 212 U. S. 19.
45 Re Marin Municipal Water Dist. (Calif.) P. U. R. 9 15C, 433 at 452.
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five expert engineers turned in valuations of $919,204, $1,031,436,
$670,[63, $723,001.85, and $763,028, showing a difference between
the lowest and the highest of $361,273 or more than 50%. and this
not at a time when valuations had just begun and methods were
undeveloped, but only one year ago. We need not be surprised to
find, as we do, such wide variations in results in Sinyth v. Antes in
1898, but what shall be said when it appears we are not approaching
more settled conditions in 1915? In many details engineers have
worked out the problem, but on the total result we seem as far away
as ever. Indeed in a typical and recent Illinois case,40 there were
five appraisers, no two used identical theories, and the results were
$547,488, $588,262, $806,404, $898,785, and $940,988, the highest
lacking not much of double the lowest. On the various and sundry
theories under which the appraisers worked the commission thought
a volume could easily be written." The Wisconsin Commission finds
high grade experts differing widely in giving evidence on values
when they are called by private interests, and the fact that they
"were disinterested and were employed by the state does not seem
to have affected the rule" for one expert put the value of the prop-
erty at $i,ioo,ooo, or $400,000 in excess of the value fixed by
another."'
If this were true of the tangible, how much more of the intangible
values. It is believed that these wide differences in valuation by
experts for the company and for the public are present in every case
except where the experts agreed to work together, as in a recent
Maryland case.48  "Skilled witnesses come with such prejudice in
their minds that hardly any weight should be given to their evi-
dence. ' 49 Findings on such conjectures give little assurance that the
case will be rightly decided unless it can be said that the compromise
figure of the court or commission will be a fair guess," or in cases
where, even taking the highest or lowest figures as correct, it is clear
46Springfield v. Springfield Gas & M. Co. (Ill.) P. U. R. igi6C, 281 at 305.
47 Sec also Re Cripple Creek Water Co. (Colo.) P. U. R. 19z6C, 788 at 797.
47 Duluth St. R. Co. v. Railroad Commission (Wis.) P. U. R. xgtsD, 211.
's Re Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. (Md.) P. U. R. x96C, 925.
"Baxter v. C. & N. WV. Ry., (r899) 104 Vis. 307, 331, approved in Appleton Water
Works Co. v. Railroad Comm. (1913) 154 Vis. 121, 154, quoting Lord Campbell in
Tracy Peerage Case, zo Clark & Fin. 154, 191.
&'The supposition that striking averages will give correct results is called absurd
and childish in Re Chesapeake & P. Tel. Co. (Md.) P. U. R. x96C, 925 at 945.
The commission in that case thought it relieved of this childish result because the
engineers worked together and presented an agreed valuation. But is it so certain
the engineers did not reach this agreement by the same striking of averages? Why
should they agree here, when working independently they differ so widely?
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the contentions of the party relying on such figures must fail.
5 '
Often a case resolves itself into a contest between the engineers of
the company and of the public, in which the opposing lawyers are
further contestants.
5 2
Every item entering into this valuation is subject to the same Nx ide
differences in estimates, some authorities rejecting entirely and
others granting various allowances for engineering and superin-
tendence, contractors' profits,, interest and taxes during construction,
promoters' profits, legal expenses, working capital, and-lest any-
thing be overlooked-an item for blanket allowances.
5 3 Especially
is this true as to depreciation, and going value or going concern
value. The utter uncertainty of depreciation allowances is con-
stantly shown. It seems to be settled that allowances for deprecia-
tion must be made, 54 and yet many urge, with good effect, that in
many plants in which annual upkeep is properly maintained there is
not only no real depreciation, but a real appreciation.
55 The life of
iron pipe has been estimated at thirty years, fifty years, seventy-five
years, but who can say? Admittedly engineers do not know. It may
last. a thousand 'years. 56 Other parts of a plant are much more
destructible and admit of closer approximation as to efficient service.
It may be possible to say that street railway equipment must be re-
newed on the average once in twelve years, and if so depreciation
can be determined with accuracy as to such property. The plant of
a gas or.water company is far otherwise.
57
The speculative and uncertain nature of going value extends
to its meaning, which is rarely twice the same,
58 and to its
amount, which has been said to vary from 5% to 3o%."
9
5 See Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. (19o9) 212 U. S. xg, and Knoxville Water
Co. v. Knoxville (19o9) 212 U. S. x.
2 In re Janesville Water Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. xgiSA, 178 at 20X; In re Northampton
Gas Petition (Mass.) P. U. R. x91sA, 6%8 at 626; Meek v. Consumers' Electric L. &
P. Co. (Mo.) P. U. R. x9 1sA, 956 at 961; Springfield v. Springfield Gas & Fl. 
Co. (I1.)
P. U. R. 1x6C, 281 at 308.
5 Compare the estimates of $zrx,56o.86 and $49,254 by two engineers and their
allowances and disallowances in Commercial Club v. Public Utilities Commission (Mo.)
P. U. R. x9sC, 1o,7 at 1034, typical of many cases that might be cited. See note
to Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. Cedar Rapids, (29o9) 144 Iowa 426, 48 L. R. A. N. S.
205 at 1037 and cases cited.
5, Knoxville Water Co. v. Knoxville, (I9o9) 212 U. S. x, 10.
ssMinnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352, 456.
53 In re Janesville Water Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. xprsA, 178 at x92.
57 Milwaukee Electric R. & L. Co. v. Milwaukee (z898) 87 Fed. 577, 583; In re Janes-
ville Water Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. xgxsA, 178 at 202.
'Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines (2915) 238 U. S. 153; Springfield v. Spring-
field Gas & El. Co. (Ill.) P. U. R. xgz6C, 28z at 358; Re Los Angeles (Calif.) P. U. R.
x9x6F, 593, 664 ff.
"Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad Commission (913) 254 Wis. 121, 146,
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When courts, after giving the experts their innings, attempt
to eliminate speculative uncertainties and give the problem of
going value "pretty close mathematical solution" the result does
not represent all that has been treated as going concern value, but
only capitalization of deficits in early years of operation. These
may have been made up by excess earnings rater, they may have
never actually existed, or they may have been due to bad manage-
ment or judgment, in all of which cases they should not be allowed
any value.0 Some courts, however, insist that they shall not be
offset from later earnings, but shall be capitalized as part of the plant
on which earnings may be perpetually continued.61 It seems now to
be decided by the United States Supreme Court in Des Moines Gas
Co. v. Des Moines,"2 that there is no fixed rule for determining "go-
ing concern value," but each case must be determined on its own
circumstances. This is certainly a refusal to consider that it can be
determined with exactness. It seems to depend on the judgment of
the appraisers in each case, and in the Des Moines case the court
refused to presume it had not been sufficiently allowed for, although
the master had expressly refused to make any further allowance for
"going value" after he had made allowance for overhead charges.
He found it would cost to reproduce the plant new $,975,026. To
this he added overhead charges, I5%,-$296,254. He then deducted
depreciation, $333,878 and fixed the valuation at $1,937,402. Of
course each of these items was found on what seemed to the master
sufficient principles, yet each involved a very large element of judg-
ment, and it is fairly inferable from the language of the court that
if the master had added $3oo00,0 to the figures instead of rejecting
that amount, the court would not have felt inclined to disturb his
findings. This is a very large difference, and yet it is matter of
everyday experience that experts in their findings differ much more
than this on reproductions, overheads, going concern value, etc.
Fifteen percent for overheads is a lump guess. Twelve percent
would pass as well, or ten percent, or twenty. Moreover, the whole
matter of reproduction takes one into a field of the imagination and
into speculations on conditions and values of which there are abund-
ant illustrations in the Minnesota Rate Cases.
63 It is one of the
interesting features of allowance of these theoretical expenses that
w People v. Willcox (914) 21ol N. Y. 479, quoted in Hermann v. Newton Gas Co.
(N. Y.) P. U. R. xx6D, 825 at 832; Re Portland Ry. L. & P. Co. (Ore.) P. U. R.
xqx6D, 976 at 1oso.
ftAppleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad Commission (x9x3) x54 Wis. 121, 254;
People v. Willcox (1914) 2xo N. Y. 479.
62 (xpxS) 238 U. S. 153.
43 (xx3) 230 U. S. 352 at 4S2.
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in most cases they were never as matter of fact incurred on the
capital account.64 Insofar as they have been incurred at all they
have been charged to current expense and paid for by the public,
which is now asked to pay again in rates, or upon purchase price i
condemnation. This, is particularly true of utilities that have had a
gradual growth through many years, not so much of the few that
have been developed on a large scale within a very short period.
Engineers, lawyers, superintendents, are ordinarily carried on the
payroll, and construction work is done by the company and not by
contractors who must have a contractor's profits. Of course there
are numerous exceptions, but they should not make the rule.65
This brief notice of current valuation cases, which is intended to
be neither a discussion of principles nor a review of even the most
important cases, but merely a look at some typical cases to see the
difficulties and wild uncertainties of present methods, we may con-
clude with what we may term a confession, in one of the best known
recent decisions. "The ascertainment of that value is not controlled
by artificial rules. It is not a matter of formulas, but there must be
a reasonable judgment having its basis in a proper consideration of
all relevant facts.""6 If so, it must be that HARLAN, J., was certainly
right in saying that what are the necessary elements in such an in-
quiry is always an embarrassing question. But why should it be?
Must it forever so remain? Is it impossible to make the value of a
plant a matter of bookkeeping, to be settled by a rule-of-thumb, if
you please, with a result that is fair ahd not utterly speculative? It
may be admitted that the difficulties are great and that the end can-
not be attained at once, but present methods do not have even a
tendency toward a settled condition. Indeed, they insure the very
reverse, for the most serious objection to the use of reproduction-
cost as an important element of valuation is that the appraisal is not
completed before it is worthless. Present value on such a basis is
one thing today, another tomorrow, and different on every future
day. Of what value today is an appraisal of reproduction cost com-
pleted last March? Prices of everything entering into the cost of
a utility have been increased from ten to several hundred percent.
6 7
Operating expenses must always fluctuate, and when we add the un-
certainty of an ever changing value on which earnings are to be
14 In re Blue Hill Street Ry. Co. (Mass.) P. U. R. 1gsE, 370 at 384; Hermann
v. Newton Gas Co. (N. Y.) P. U. R. 19z6D, 825 at 84o.
es Hermann v. Newton Gas Co. (N. Y.) P. U. R. 1gx6D, 82S5 at 839, 841.
6' Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352 at 434.
7 Springfield v. Springfield Gas & El. Co. (Ill.) P. U. R. xgx6C, 285 at 312,
quoting discussion in United States Senate over Railroad Valuation Bill, Congressional
Record 380!.
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allowed, we are not surprised that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission does not complete one long and tedious hearing on petition
for an advance in rates until another is filed for hearing. As pointed
out by Commissioner Lane, in In re Advanced Rates-Western
Cases,6 § the only check on an advance in rates because of the enor-
mous increase in values is the principle that the charges must be
reasonable to the public, even though the utility cannot earn a
reasonable return on the fair value of the property being used for
the public. But if anything could be more uncertain than the ele-
ments already considered, it is this question of what charge is
reasonable to the public. Is it reasonable to carry a message from
New York to San Francisco for twenty-five cents? Surely, if it is
to go by special messenger the charge is ridiculously low, and our
fathers paid that price for carrying a letter a few miles. But now
we pay two cents. In Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co.,"' it
seemed to Justice BREWvR that a rate of eighteen cents and five mills
per capita for caring for cattle was so small as to suggest, certainly,
no extortion. But we should say today that the smallness of the
charge is no criterion if a lesser rate would yield the public utility a
proper return. And Lord Chancellor SELBORN E7 thought if it could
not be said any particular toll for the use of the bridge could be said
to be unreasonable in view of the service rendered and the benefit
received, it was most extraordinary to complain and seek to examine
the profits of the bridge company, unless the case could be imagined
where the profits should be enormously disproportionate to the
money laid out. But that he considered merely imaginary. How
soon the courts pronounced otherwise! The fact is the rate that is
reasonable to the public in the normal case is the rate for which the
company can afford to render the service, as is shown by all the
recent cases. To be sure it is said that if a line is laid out with
poor judgment so that it cannot pay without unreasonable charges
the owners have no right to insist on the return. But it is difficult to
find an instance where the court in such a case has upheld a reduc-
tion in rates because the proposed charge was unreasonable to the
public.71 As a practical working principle the doctrine that rates
must be reasonable to the public as to the charge for the individual
service is of very narrow application and has been involved in few
0(1911) 20 I. C. C. Rep. 307.
co(9o1) 183 U. S. 79, 98.
7' Canada Southern Ry. v. International Bridge Co. (883) 8 A. C. 723, 73r.
-'See Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. (1894) 154 U. S. 362; Smyth v.
Ames (z898) x69 U. S. 466, 574; Re Advanced Rates-Western Case (1911) 20 I. C.
C. Rep. 307, 337.
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cases. 2 This rule is no safe protection against raising of rates be-
cause of increases in valuation.
In conclusion may we hope for the adoption of one clear and
definite theory of valuation to the exclusion of all others, except
they may be needed, for a time, in checking uncertainties or supply-
ing deficiencies because of lack of reliable records or proper systems
of accounting? A satisfactory answer to this question must rest on
something more fundamental than a comparison of the workableness
and relative advantages of the various theories. It must rest upon
the basic principles of the relations of the public to public utilities
A public utility is something the public needs. It may build the
utility as a public enterprise or leave it to private capital. If it pur-
sue the latter course it practically says to capital, construct and
manage the utility reasonably and the public will make every reason-
able effort to insure a fair return on the investment. Fancy prices
and fancy profits alike are not allowed, but steady, reliable promise
should attract capital. The returns should be primarily what is fair,
first and foremost, to the public, and second to the public service, in
every case to both, if possible. Enough has been' said about what is
fair to the public, the rate must be reasonable. Then, if consistent
with such reasonable charge to the public, the public must allow the
service to earn a reasonable return. But on what? Much of the
difficulty here arising is due to a failure to distinguish between
investment in private and in public enterprises. Public utilities have
been speculated in like private business adventures, but nearly al-
ways with results disastrous to the public receiving the service, and
to most of the public investing in the securities. What the public
needs is a stability in the public service property that will attract
sufficient capital to furnish satisfactory services.7 3  The great
majority of those furnishing the capital seek a safe and sure return,
not on speculative values but on money adventured. The few who
may have grown very rich or very poor in speculations in public
utilities may be dismissed. Their interests are usually adverse to
the good, alike of the public and the ordinary stockholder. Our
public utilities today are maintained on money furnished by many
millions of our people, and it is desirable that it should be so. To
secure this there should be reasonable assurance to investors of fair
earnings. On what? Why, on the investment, on what (under
proper conditions) has been put into the public use.
72 See Kennebec Water Dist. v. Waterville (9oz) 97 Me. 285; In re San Jose Water
Co. (Calif.) P. U. R. 9x95, 7o6 at 711; Re Portland Ry. L. & P. Co. (Orel) P. U. R.
19 x6D, 976 at 2046.
73 See: Legal Basis of Rate Regulations, i Col. L. Rev. 532 at 540.
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In this connection the use of the terms "value" and "valuation"
is unfortunate. It is not-value in any ordinary sense that is being
sought, as has often been noticed.7 4 The basis for all dealings in-
volving purchase and rate making should be, not actual cost, not
reproduction cost, not market value, not stock and bond issue. It
should be what has been well called the "efficient investment,"
7 ; i. e.,
the actual amount honestly and prudently invested in the utility,
under normal conditions; no more, no less.7
1 The "efficient invest-
ment" theory eliminates all consideration of losses due to misman-
agement. Those must be charged against stockholders. "The com-
pany is held to the same standard of honesty and prudence in the
management and maintenance as in the original acquisition of its
properties. ' 77 It takes no account of bad property investments,
8 it
eliminates all the objectionable elements that have been urged
against the actual cost theory. As it has been stated in a recent
case by the Washington Commission, "it would seem equitable, just
and fair that the public should be required to furnish fair, just and
reasonable compensation for the reasonable and necessary detriment
a utility has suffered by reason of its service to the public."
7
But not only is a fair return on the "efficient investment" fair and
just, its practical advantage is that it is a fixed and not a shifting
thing. Reproduction value is as unstable as water. Efficient invest-
ment represents, not what the public does for the property of the
company, but what the company does for the public. It does not
depend on money market, or rates, or market prices of labor or
material, or on values created by the public and not by the service.
It does not change with hard times, or shifting population, or the
fickle and varying judgments of appraisers or courts. It is a certain
and fixed amount which is determined for all time. It is only a
matter of proper bookkeeping to keep it up so as to show its amount
as of any given date.8  It is a standard, fixed, natural, "rate base"
from which the service flows, and on which all relations between the
11 Buffalo Gas Case, (2nd Dist., N. Y. 1915) 3 P. S. C. R. 353, 644, approved in In re
Blue Hill St. R. Co. (mass.) P. U. R. 1915E, 370 at 395; Public Service Comm. v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Wash.) P. U. R. xi96D, 947 at 954; Re Chesapeake & P.
Tel. Co. (Md.) P. U. R. xg6C, 925 at 946.
15 Re Portland Ry. L. & P. Co. (Ore.) P. U. R. xg16D, 976 at x047.
10Mdiddlese.x & Boston Rate Case (1914) 2 Mass. P. S. C. R. ios, approved in
In re Blue Hill St. R. Co. (Mass.) P. U. R. 1915E, 37o at 379. Cf. Re Chesapeake "8
P. Tel. Co. (Md.) P. U. R. x916C, 925 at 948.
"In re Blue Hill St. R. Co. (Mass.) P. U. R. x195, 370 at 398.
"8 In re Crownover Tel. Co. (Neb.) P. U. R. 1x910, 571 at 574; Minnesota Rate
Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352.
"Public Service Comm. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Wash.) P. U. R. 19g6D,
947 at 955.
soDuluth St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission (Wis.) P. U. R. 1giD, x92 at 209.
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service and the public should rest. "The old methods have proven
uncertain, indefinite, and unsatisfactory to honest utilities and com-
missions alike. Their chief use has been to furnish an easy method
to conceal inflated values and dubious financial transactions." A
method is needed "that will eliminate speculation, allow the honest
investor to prosper, and destroy the crooked financier.",'
It cannot be urged that the adoption of the "efficient investment"
as the valuation base would not be attended with difficulties. But
they are no greater than have attended all fair value computations
on the indefinite rule of the past, even when the cost-of-reproduc-
tion-less-depreciation, and plus some uncertain, but considerable,
other items has been adopted . 2 And once the initial difficulties are
past, what was before all uncertainty and matter of dispute becomes
as certain as ledger balances. The first embarrassment arises from
past poor bookkeeping or loss or destruction, sometimes wilful, of
records. But records are now being preserved, and public utilities
can be, as railroads now are, required to keep and render such ac-
counts as may be completely adequate to show all future additions
to efficient investment account. Indeed the situation has measurably
cleared up already with reference to great classes of utilities, and
especially as to all public utilities in states where commissions have
for some years had accounting reduced to a system.83
The other chief obstacle, arising from holding companies, reorgan-
izations, uncontrolled issue of securities, is, like the bookkeeping,
already in process of proper regulation, and as to the future can
easily be reduced to order and certainty. 4 The great initial diffi-
culty lies in getting a starting point from which to apply the method.
Where the amount of the efficient investment is wholly uncertain,
and in the absence of any reliable data, it is clear that some basing
figures must be arrived at, and from that on all may be clear sail-
ing. 5 To reach such a figure, in cases where direct evidence of
efficient investment is lost or unreliable, it is very likely best to fol-
low the suggestion of Smyth v. Ames and consider various methods
of valuation, but all these should be judged with a view to determin-
ing, not the present cost of producing such a plant, but as nearly as
$'Reynolds, Chairman of Washington Public Service Commission, in Public Service
Comm. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Wash.) P. U. R. 19i6D 947. See also Hermann
v. Newton Gas Co. (N. Y.) P. U. R. x916D, 825 at 839, 840; Springfield v. Springfield
G~s & l. Co. (Ill.) P. U. R. z9x6C, 28! at 314.
2 In re Janesville Water Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. 19isA, i78 at 183.
61 Public Service Comm. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. (Wash.) P. U. R. x96D, 947
at 956.
14See Commercial Club v. Missouri Public Utilities Comm. (Mo.) P. U. R. 1915C,
1o7 at iods; In re Northampton Gas Petition (Mass.) P. U. R. i9r5A, 618 at 626.
ssAs in Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. (05og) 212 U. S. 19, 43; Minnesota Rate
Cases (913) 230 U. S. 352, 440-
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possible the efficient investment in such plant, for that is the fair
value of what is being used at the present time for the public.80 This
would exclude all wornout and cast-off equipment. This should
have been wiped off the books by annual allowance for depreciation,
and if it has not been done the stockholders cannot ask the public
to capitalize this as a basis for future earnings. It would leave out
all losses from mismanagement, for they do not represent efficient
investment.8 7 It would omit all earnings put back into the plant even
though the stockholders might have had a right to take them out in
the form of dividends, but did not. It would deduct for deprecia-
tion in plant which should have been kept up out of earnings, but
which has been deferred for dividends."' It would refuse return on
property purchased for future need until such property is actually
used for the public.80 It might add another item to those named by
Justice HARLAN in Smyth v. Ames, viz., the known efficient invest-
ment in other similar plants with such allowances for dissimilarity
as seems called for.
All this would involve judgment, and uncertainty, and conflicting
views of experts, at this point of departure, but only in cases where
accurate figures are not available. And this uncertainty once fixed,
the future is definite. The vice of present methods is not merely
their uncertainty, but the fact that they fail to lead toward either
certainty or stability. Finally, this efficient investment would be
subject to the familiar check that the public cannot be charged more
than the service is worth, even though the utility fails to earn a fair
return. As has been shown, this is a slender reed on which to rest,
but it is as good under this theory as under any other, and occasion-
ally it may be applied. 0 In securing this base valuation, insofar as
it may be necessary to use the reproduction cost, the figures should
be based, not on the cost at a particular date, but on the average cost
for a number of years, preferably, if possible, the years during which
the installations were being made. This would avoid great injustices
that might arise to the utility by valuations based on costs in 1893
to 1896, and to the public by using 1916 prices.0"
sSee In re Portland Ry. L. & P. Co. (Ore.) P. U. R. sgs6D, 976 at 1o13; Spring-
field v. Springfield Gas & El. Co. (I1l.) P. U. R. 19x6C, 2&r at 314; Bogart v. Wis-
consin Tel. Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. 19 i6C, 102o at 1037.
87 Re Falls Light & Power Co. (Wis.) P. U. R. x1x6D, 1s at 164.
' Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. (1909) 212 U. S. 1, 13; Butler v. Lewiston,
A. & V. St. Ry. (Me). P. U. R. z96D, 25 at 45.
"' Minnesota Rate Cases (1913) 230 U. S. 352 at 467.
°°In re Portland Ry. L. & P. Co. (Ore.) P. U. R. zgr6D, 976 at 1046; Duluth
St. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Comm. (Wis.) P. U. R. i9r5D, 19
z 
at 205.
01 See In re Northeastern Oil & Gas Co. (Ohio) P. U. R. xgs6D, 692 at 695; In
re Portland Ry. L. & P. Co. (Ore.) P. U. R. 1gx6D, 976 at 1o47; Knoxville v. Knox-
ville Water Co. (z9o9) 212 U. S. i at x5.
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If it be urged that the courts and commissions by decisions for
twenty years are bound to other methods, and changes can be made
only by statute, the answer is that statutes may be necessary in some
jurisdictions, but the whole matter of theories and definitions is still
so uncertain92 that most courts and commissions are fairly free to
adopt this one base. using other matters only in doubtful cases to
aid in fixing this base. Not a few commissions, with a desire born
out of the chaos of present methods, are turning to it. The view of
Commissioner RiEYNOLDS in Public Service Commission v. Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co.,5 3 has already been extensively quoted from. It
reached the writer after this article had been largely completed, and
shows the relief the Washington Commission felt to have the utility
come before it with a frank statement, and submit "actual per-
formance, segregated or separated in accordance with Interstate
Commerce accounting, supplemented by such state commission ac-
counting as may be essential," giving "an array of facts as distin-
guished from an array of opinion, expert or otherwise, that ought
to be the recourse for constructive and efficient regulation." The
New York Commission regards it with high favor in a very recent
case ;904 the Indiana Commission regards it as "very valuable evi-
dence" when it can be ascertained ;95 the New Hampshire Commis-
sion as late as July T5, 1916, pointed out the absurdities of the cost-
of-reproduction method, which it characterizes as "all speculation
and conjecture ;-06 the Missouri Commission considers original cost
to date as determined by competent auditing as affording "most
satisfactory evidence as to value, based as it is on facts capable of
more or less exact determination, under proper accounting meth-
ods ;97 the Massachusetts Commission regards cost of reproduction
with suspicion and favors what seems very like "efficient invest-
ment ;,,55 in Nevada the reproduction theory was rejected in a late
case for the investment ;90 the Maine Commission refuses to con-
sider reproduction-cost where original cost can be ascertained with
substantial accuracy ;100 as does the Colorado Commission.'" These
are all very late cases, to which others might be added. The efficient
investment base is strongly approved by legal writers who have given
"'See In re Portland Ry. L. & P. Co. (Ore.) P. U. R. x i6D, 947 at xoo.
23P. U. R. xgi6D, 947.
91 Hermann v. Newton Gas Co. (N. Y.) P. U. R. xgx6D, 825.
9 Commercial Club v. Citizens' Gas & Fuel Co. (Ind.) P. U. R. xgi6E, I at 7.
96 Re Grafton County I,. & P. Co. (N. H.) P. U. R . xgx6, 879 at 882.
'Re Dunham (Mo.) P. U. Rt. xgi6E, 544 at 597; Re Rates Missouri St. Ry. Co.
(Mo.) P. U. Rt. xg16C, 607 at 6z8.
"In re Northampton Gas Petition (Mass.) P. U. R. igisA, 618 at 6;6; Bay State
Rate Case (Mass.) P. U. R. igi6F, 221.
"Public Service Comm. v. Steamboat Canal Co. (Nev.) P. U. t. 19 1SF, 718 at 721.
0* Butler v. Lewiston, A. & W. St. Ry. Co. (Me.) P. U. R. 19 16D, 25 at 35.
10' Re Cripple Creek Water Co. (Colo.) P. U. R. igi6C, 788 at 799.
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the subject most attention.0 2 And the courts are not so committed
to any theory as to prevent their general adoption of this. Efficient
investment was strongly approved in cases before Smyth v. Ames
already noticed, 1 3 approving it as the "basic criterion of revenue
to be allowed," and recent cases are not wanting which, like Coal &
Coke Railway Company v. Conley,0 4 look with strong favor upon it
as the correct base. The most difficult rule of the courts to meet
would be that they have often said present value must govern, and
this may be less than cost-in which case the company must bear the
loss-or more-in which case the company is entitled to the gain.
This introduces the speculative into public utilities and is unfortun-
ate. If the courts do not feel at liberty to change from the uncer-
tainties of Smyth v. Antes, then the legislatures should do it for
them. Congress seems already to have considered this in its dis-
cussion of the Railway Valuation Act before referred to.
There has been so much antagonism because of past injustices
that it has been hard to realize that ultimately the highest good of
the public and of investors in public utilities are one. To secure a
good service it is to the public interest to make investment in public
utilities attractive, and to give a return on such investment not
merely equal to, but somewhat higher than, returns in kindred pri-
vate enterprises. Returns should not be too high, however, or they
will attract not the investing public, but speculators and manipula-
tors, to the detriment alike of the public and of honest investors. It
is also to the public interest to assure, as far as possible, to the
investor in public utilities, a return on what is really put into the
utility, in good faith and with prudence and good judgment. Such
a condition would do much to substitute for the antagonism and
often unreasonable suspicion now existing between the public and
public service companies that harmonious and understanding rela-
tion based upon mutual respect for rights and observance of duties,
that is so needed to make public service satisfactory. Once past
the initial difficulties, which are not at all insurmountable, the
"efficient investment" theory will insure between the public and pub-
lic utilities a relationship which is fair to both, which will attract
the necessary capital by making the investment almost as safe as
governmental securities, and which will make possible and probable
an adequate and efficient service. EDWIN C. GODD
University of Michigan Law School.
=0 Whitten, Valuation of Public Service Corporations, 83 if., 835. But contra
see a recent article: The United States Supreme Court and Rate Regulation, 64 Univ.
of Penna. L. Rev. x, by Douglas D. Storey; and Legal Basis of Rate Regulation, zx
Col. L. Rev. 532 at 538, 545, by Edward C. Bailly.
2w See San Diego Water Co. v. San Diego (1897) zx8 Calif. 556 at 568.
104 (910) 67 W. Va. z9 at 191.
